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Abstract: This paper analyzes the optimal choice of pricing schedules and technological de- 
terrence levels in a market with digital piracy, when legal sellers can sometimes control the extent 
of piracy by implementing digital rights management ( D M )  systems. It is shown that the seller's 
optimal pricing schedule can be characterized as a simple combination of the zero-piracy pricing 
schedule, and a pimcy-indiffewnt pricing schedule which makes all customers indifferent between 
legal consumption and piracy. An increase in the level of piracy is shown to lower prices and profits, 
but may improve welfare by expanding the fraction of legal users and the volume of legal usage. 
In the absence of price-discrimination, the optimal level of technology-based protection against 
piracy is shown to be the technologically-maximal level, which maximizes the difference between 
the qnality of the legal and pirated goods. Howem, when a seller can price-discriminate, it is 
always optimal for them to choose a strictly lower level of technology-based protection. Moreover, 
if a DRM system weakens over time, due to its technology being progrcssivcly hncked, thc optimal 
strategic response may involve either increasing or decreasing the level of technology-based protec- 
tion and the corresponding prices. This direction of change is related to whether the technology 
implementing each marginal reduction in piracy is increasingly less or more vulnerable to hacking. 
Pricing and technology choice guidelines based on these results are presented, and some social 
welfare issues are discussed. 
'I thank Ravi Mantena for his careful reading of thii- paper and his detailed comments. I aLso thank seminar 
participants at New York University for their feedback on an earlier version of this paper. All errors and omi.-sions 
remain mine. 
1. Introduction 
Over the last decade, sellers of digital products have actively fought the availability of pirated 
copies of their products. Nevertheless, digital piracy rates are still high and increasing in many 
markets, despite a continuous increase in the availability and sophistication of copy protection and 
digital rights management technologies. Piracy concerns have expanded following the emergence of 
file-sharing networks like Gnutella and Kazaa, which have substantially increased the availability 
and exchange of high-quality illegal versions of software, music and digital video. 
The sustained presence of piracy complicates the design of pricing schedules for sellers of digital 
goods. It also poses the new challenge of choosing an appropriate level of technology-based protec- 
tion, and of responding strategically to the hacking of existing digital rights management systems. 
These are the issues addressed by the model in this paper. 
The first part of the paper studies optimal pricing strategy. When faced with rising digital 
piracy, a seller's pricing power is increasingly limited by the quality and availability of pirated 
copies, which are imperfect substitutes for the legally available product. This effect of piracy is 
analyzed in a model of monopoly price discrimination, when valuations of both legal products and 
illegal copies differ across customers. It is shown that the seller's optimal pricing sdiedule can be 
characterized as asimple combination of two contracts - the optimal pricing schedule in the absence 
of piracy (termed the zero-piracy pricing schedule), and a pimcy-indiffewnt pricing schedule, which 
makes all customers indifferent between legal usage and piracy. An increase in the quality of pirated 
goods lowers prices and profits; however, there may be social benefits from piracy realized through 
the expansion of the fraction of legal users and the volume of legal usage. 
The next part of this paper studies technology-based protection against digital piracy, which 
is typically achieved by implementing digital rights management (henceforth referred to as D M )  
systems. Examples of DRM systems for digitally delivered prodilcts include Macrovision Safecast, 
Microsoft Windows Media DRM Series, and Real Networks Helix D M .  Other DRM systems 
aimcd specifically at  protecting thc physical sources of the digital files shared illegally over the 
Internet include the Windows hfedia Data Session Toolkit, and Macrovision's Cactus Data Shield. 
Implementing a DRM system enables a seller to deter and control piracy to some extent. Unfor- 
tunately, as a DRM system becomes more effective, it often simultaneously places more restrictions 
on the flexibility of usage for a legal user, and thereby reduces the value of the legal product. For 
instance, in 2002, a number of music labels (most notably, Sony) introduced protection technology 
that would prevent their audio CD's from being played on personal computers2. This reduced 
value by restricting inter-device portability; moreover, a substantial fraction of discs did not work 
on regular CD and DVD players3. Many online music services implement DRM by limiting the 
rendering of their MP3 files to a single device, and by placing related restrictions on the portability 
of these files4. Highly restricted services like MusicNet and Rhapsody have not been well-received, 
and this is partly attributed to the fact that their protection schemes "...treat everyone like a 
potential criminal, and they take all the joy out of buying and playing music" (Mossberg, 2003). 
In contrast, the i'hnes music service from Apple, which places substantially fewer restrictions6 on 
their customers' ability to download, share and burn purchased MP3 files, has been a resounding 
success in its first few weeks. 
There are more direct ways in which implementing technology-based protection may necessitate 
degrading the value of a legal product. Currently, textual content that is protected by Adobe's DRM 
partners can be electronically scanned by OCR software that takes PDF files as direct inputs and 
produces near-perfect scanned versions. Countering this form of piracy will necessitate degrading 
fonts in rendered legal files, thereby lowering quality for legal users. Protecting digital video or music 
files using encryption makes the corresponding files larger, which may lower value by increasing 
download times for digitally delivered content. 
These observations suggest that when choosing their DRM system and the corresponding level 
of technology-based protection again~t piracy, the seller of a digital good needs to trade-off the 
effectiveness of deterring piracy with the value reduction of the legal product that is caused by 
the implementation of the DRM system. To study this trade-off, the model of pricing with digital 
piracy developed in this paper is extended to incorporate cndogenous choices of technology-based 
protection. The technologically-maximal level of protection, which is the level of technology-bawd 
protection at which the quality diflemnce between the legal good and the pirated good is maximized, 
is contrasted with the profit-matimizing lcvcl of protection. When the seller can price-discriminate, 
the profit-maximizing level of protection is shown to be strictly lower than the technologically- 
'Sony's KeyZAudio system worked by adding a bogus data track to each audio CD. Since computer hard drives 
are programmed to read data files filat, the technology relied on P C .  mntim8onsly attempting to play the bogus 
track, and never getting to the music files. The system failed, however, when it became known that simply blacking 
out the outermost track of the CD with a marker could override the protection. 
3F'0r instanec, an early mleasc made under the Cactus format in G e m n y  reportedly had s 4% return rate kom 
people who found that thew CDs didn't work on their normal CD players. 
'The m a t  recent version of MusicNet, launched on AOL in February 2003, does not permit tranderring MP3 f i le  
to portable players, and limits the number of files that can be burnt onto a CD. 
'iTunw allows uners to burn their MP3 files to an unlimited number of CD's, copy them to an unlimited number 
of iPod MP3 players, and play them on upto three Macintosh computers. 
maximal level. The economic drivers of this result are explored in some detail, since it indicates 
that even after accounting for the quality degradation imposed on legal products, a DRM system 
that maximizes the quality gap between the legal good and the pirated good is overprotecting the 
digital product. As the effectiveness of a DRM system weakens over time (which typically occurs 
due to its technology being progressively hacked), the optimal technological and pricing responses 
for the seller are examined. It is shown that the seller's optimal response may either be to decrease 
or to increase their level of technology-based protection, and conditions under which each of these 
responses is optimal are characterized. 
Related work: A distinguishing aspect of this paper is its formal analysis of the economic 
effects of DRM technologies, and their role as technological deterrents to piracy that are controlled 
explicitly (and strategically) by a seller. Recent related work on optimal deterrence includes Chen 
and Png (2001) who study monopoly investment levels in piracy detection (an indirect form of 
deterrence), and Yoon (2001) who provides a simple model of the optimal level of protection chosen 
by a monopolist. Related policy issues are also examined by Png and Chen (2003) who consider how 
a regulator should balance taxing copying and subsidizing legitimate purchases when a monopolist 
invests in piracy detection, and by Gopal and Sanders (1998) who examine how governmental 
incentives to enforce copyright laws are related to the size of the domestic software industry. Other 
work on piracy-related P2P technologies include Duchene and Waelboeck (2001) who model the 
effects of these technologies on new-product introduction, and Gayer and Shy (2002) who explore 
their role as a marketing vehicle to spur in-store sales. An early model of piracy deterrence is Conner 
and Rummelt (1991) who established that increases in protection technology always increase 6rm 
profits, unless the product displays positive network effects. 
This paper builds on and adds to this literature significantly, providing a richer model of the 
economics of technology-based piracy deterrence, and deriving new results on choosing optimal 
protection strategies. For instance, it is shown that cvcn in the absence of network effects, increases 
in protection technology can reduce finn profits, and the right response to an increase in the level 
of piracy may be a weakening of protection levels, rather than a tightening of them. 
This paper also contributes to the literature on the economics of copyingfi and piracy, which 
has seen a significant resurgence in the wake of Napster and other Internet-based piracy threats. 
Some of the recent research in this area is surveyed and extensively supplemented in Watt (2000). 
"This is part of a larger body of work ou the ecouomics of intellectual property and cupyright. A good guide to the 
literature on the economics of copyright can be found in B e n  and Raskind (1991). The papers by Liebowitz (1985) 
and Johnson (1985) are notable as early examplw of the economics of piracy end copying technology, in contrast 
wit,h much of the literature's focus on socially optimal copright. policy. 
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More recently, Alvisi, Argentisi and Carbonara (2002) analyze whether the presence of a pirated 
good may make it optimal for a monopolist to introduce a lower-quality substitute for their prod- 
uct. Belleflamme (2002) studies the interdependence between different producers' incentives to 
accommodate/deter the presence of a pirated good. Ben-Shahar and Jacob (2002) examine the 
entry-deterring properties of piracy, characterizing a monopolist's incentives to encourage piracy 
as a form of predatory pricing. Chellappa and Shivendu (2002) model pricing when buyers bear a 
'moral cost' from using a pirated good derived from an evaluation version of the legal good. 
The model in this paper builds on the approach of each these papers, by prescrving thcir 
notion of the pirated good as an inferior (vertically differentiated) substitute for the legal good. 
However, it generaliaes their pricing analysis significantly, by modeling and deriving a continuous 
pricing schedule (rather than a single variable price, or a pair of prices for two quality-differentiated 
products) which explicitly takes into account the diflering value of pirated products to diflemnt 
customers. This generalization substantially alters results relating to the optimal level of tech- 
nological protection, and to post-implementation protection and pricing trends - differences that 
would not be evident in a model with unit consumption and no price discrimination. Furthermore, 
results from this paper are more likely to provide managerially relevant pricing guidelines, by pre- 
scribing a straightforward way to actually design pricing schedules in the presence of digital piracy. 
For instance, different users of pay-per-download services like the i'hnes music service from Apple 
download different numbers of songs, and have a different willingness to pay for each additional 
download, but pay a fixed (linear) price per download. If Apple wants to use price discrimina- 
tion to generate higher revenues from their service, they would need guidelines for the design of a 
usage-based pricing schedule in the presence of a piracy threat. 
The model also adds to the growing literature on price screening in technology markets, in 
which theories developed by Naor (1969), Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (19&1) 
have been adapted and applied to problems uniquc to technology markets. Nault (1997), Jones 
and Mendelson (1998), Konana, Gupta and Whinston (2000), Bhargava and Choudhary (2001), 
Bhargava and Sundaresan (2002), Jing (2002), Sundararajan (2002), and Hosanagar et al. (2003) 
are good examples. Unlike the piracy models in Conner and Rummelt (1991), Takeyama (1994) 
and Shy and Thisse (1999), positive network externalities are not considered. These externalities 
are quite important in software industries; however, it is unlikely that there are substantial direct 
network effects in industries more recently threatened by digital piracy7 - music, video and content. 
'In some CBR~R, there may be indirect network cffecta (the increase in the d u e  of portable MP3 playas that has 
resulted from the wide availability of pirated music, for instance), though it seems likely that these are appropriated 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the model, 
and describes the seller's optimal pricing schedule in the absence of piracy. Section 3 charac- 
terizes optimal pricing strategy in the presence of different levels of digital piracy. Section 4 
models the economic effects of using digital rights management systems, and prescribes optimal 
technology-based protection levels, as well as strategic responses to changes in the effectiveness of 
an implemented DRM system. Section 5 discusses some results of the paper, and concludes with 
an outline of the open research questions. 
2. Model 
2.1. Seller and customers 
The model involves an information good which may be used by consumers in continuously varying 
quantitiess. The seller of this good (termed the legal good) is assumed to be a monopolist, by virtue 
of owning a copyright over the information good. Any fixed costs of production or IP protection 
are assumed to be sunk. Since the product is an information good, variable costs of production are 
zero. In addition to the legal good, there is also a pirated good available, which is a lower-quality 
substitute for the legal good, and is free. 
Customers are heterogeneous, indexed by their type 6 E [0,8]. The preferences of a customer 
of type 6 for the legal good are represented by the utility function vU(q ,  6 ) ,  where q is the quantity 
of the legal good used by the customer, and v 5 1 is a measure of the quality of the legal good. 
The function U(q ,  6 )  is assumed to take the following form: 
Based on equation (2.1) ,  it is clear that a higher customer type 6 gets higher marginal value from 
the legal good, at every level of usage. The differences in value across customer types are mediated 
to some extent by the variable w ,  which is termed the common marginal vali~n of the good. 
Numbered subscripts of fun~tions reprrvent partial derivatives with respect to the corresponding 
variable. For instance, the partial derivative of U(q ,  6 )  with respect to q is denoted Ul(q ,6 ) ,  and 
by parties other than the seller. Recent results from Sundararajan (2003) have presented a framework for analyzing 
network effects in nonlinear pricing models - a possible extension is discussed in Section 5. 
'This could either be a homogeneous good, or a bundle of related goods (such as a Library of digital information, 
music or video), from which different customers use different goods. For instance, Apple's ilhne music service offers 
ac- to a library of over 200.000 songs. Each user downloads a small fraetion of this library, and different subscribers 
download different songs. 111 the context of this model, the unit of quantity would therefore be number of downlod. 
the cross-partial of U(q,8) with respect to q and 8 is denoted Ul2(q, 8). This notation is preserved 
throughout the paper. 
The following properties of the utility function follow from equation (2.1): 
I. For every 8, U(q, 8) has a finite maximum usage a(0) = arg max U(q, 8) = (8 + w). 
9 
3. Ull(q,O) = -1, and Ul*(q,O) = 1. Therefore, U(q,B) is strictly concave in q (diminishing 
marginal value from usage), and has the Spence-Mirrlees single crossing property. 
The preferences of a customer of type 8 for the pirated good are represented by the utility 
function sU(q, 0), where q is the quantity of the pirated good used by the customer, and U(q, 6) is 
as defined in (2.1). The parameter s is a measure of the quality of the pirated good, and is also 
referred to as the level of piracy (based on the fact that at a higher level of piracy, the quality of 
the pirated good is higherg). s is assumed to be strictly less than v ,  implying that the pirated good 
is always strictly inferior to the legal good, and therefore, the seller can make a non-zero profit10. 
The maximum value that a customer of type 0 can get from a pirated good of quality s is 
denoted G(8, s): 
a(8, S )  = sU(a(B), 8) = s(6 + w ) ~  
2 .  (2.2) 
Since the pirated goods are free, G(8,s) is the reservation utility of customer type 8. 
The monopolist does not observe the type 6 of any customer, but knows F(O), the probability 
distribution of types in the customer population, which has the following properties: 
1. f (0) > 0 for all 8, where f (6) is the density corresponding to the distribution F(8). 
2. &(*) 5 0 for all 8: the inverse hazard rate is non-increasing in 0. 
For expositional simplicity, and since the hazard rate of the customer type distribution plays a 
significant role in subsequent analysis, we define the inverse hazard mte function h(8): 
*The 'level' of piracy r e f m d  to here is distinct from the pimct~ mte. The former mewares the extent to which 
the legal good can be pirated (and therefore determines the quality of the pirated good, perhap indirectly through 
its availability as well), while the latter is a measure of how many cuqtomers are actually using the pirated good. 
''Depending on the context, the parameter v may h normalized to 1, or may be replaced by the function v ( p ) .  
In addition, the parameter s may be replaced by the function s(p), or the function s(p, t ) .  Each of these functions 
will be explained in the appropriat~ aection. 
and the cumulative inverse hazard mte function H(0): 
H(8) = ] 1 ;::) dx. 
0 
Each customer knows their own type 8. Without any loss in generality, tho total numbcr of 
customers in the market is normalized to 1. 
2.2. Customer choice and pricing schedules 
The seller offers a nonlinear pricing schedule (sometimes referred to as either a contmct or a pricing 
schedule) which assigns a non-negative price to each feasible level of usage for the legal good. Rather 
than considering all possible pricing functions, the revelation principle ensures that we can restrict 
our attention to direct mechanism - menus of quantity-price pairs q (x ) ,~ (x ) ,  indexed by x E [0,8], 
which are incentive-compatible. A pricing schedule q(x) ,~(x) ,  x E [O,e], for the legal good is said 
to be incentive-compatible if it satisfies: 
8 = argmax[vU(q(x), 8) - ~ ( x ) ] ,  for a11 8. 
5 
Given a pricing schedule q(x), T(X) for the legal good, customers of type 8 choose to purchase the 
legal good if their surplus from doing so is at least as much as the value they would derive from 
the (free) pirated good. Mathematically, if: 
then customers of type 0 purchase the legal good. Therefore, an incentive-compatible pricing 
schedule q(x), ~ ( x )  is said to induce participation from customer type 8 if all customers of this type 
(weakly) prefer the legal good to the pirated good: 
The constraint (2.6) above is often referred to as the piracy wnstmint for type 8, since it becomes 
progressively harder to satisfy as s increases. Note that the piracy constraint is typedependent". 
In the special case of .9 = 0, since the pirat,& good haq no value, C(0,n) = 0, and rnnstraint (2.6) 
1 1 ~ ~  s 1s . in contrast with standard price discrimination or adverse selection models, where the RHS of the partici- 
pation (individual rationality) constraint iv normalized to zcro acre-7 all ttypn. 
above reduces to the standard individual rationality constraint of price discrimination problems. 
Finally, the optimal pricing schedule q*(x, v, s), ~ ' ( x ,  v, s) is the incentive compatible pricing 
schedule that maximizes the seller's profits12 . 
Notation used most frequently is summarizerl in Table 2.1. In general, the sequence of events 
is as follows: the seller announces their pricing schedule (and technological choices, if any), the 
customers make their purchase decisions (whether to use the legal good or the pirated good, and 
at what usage level) based on the pricing schedule, and each party gets their payoffs. An exact 
timeline is specified separately in each of the following sections. 
2.3. Optimal pricing schedule i n  the absence of piracy 
The optimal pricing schedule in the absence of piracy, termed t,he +em-pimcy prdnng sched~le, is 
specified in this section. The zerc-piracy pricing schedule benchmarks the analysis of pricing in the 
presence of piracy, and is also uscd in constructing the corresponding optimal pricing schedules. 
Lemma 1. The zero-piracy pricing schedule ~ZP(B,v),~ZP(6,v),  which is the optimal pricing 
schedule for the seller when s = 0, takes one of the following two forms. 
(a) If h(0) 5 w, then the pricing schedule is designed to include all customer types The optimal 
contract is: 
for all 0 E [o, 81. 
(b) If h(0) > w ,  then a set [O, Bzp] of customer types are priced out of the market, where Bzp 
is defined as: 
e, = e : h(e) = + 8, B E  (0,8). (2.9) 
The optimal contract is: 
"The necemry details about mechanism design and the revelation principle can be found in m y  standard graduate- 
level textbook on game theov. For example, chapter 7 of Fudenbrg and Tirole (1991) describes the revelation 
principle and a non-linear pricing application. 
Symbol I Explanation 
8 
f (01, F ( 0 )  
Index of customer types. 8 E [0, 01. 




Value that customer type 8 gets from a usage level q of the legal good. 
4 0 )  
I 
1 
Usage level which maximizes U(q ,  0 ) .  a ( 0 )  = argmaxU(q, 0) .  
9 
su(9 ,  0 )  
c ( 0 ,  s )  
Value that customer type 8 gets from a usage level q of the pirated good. 
Maximum value that customer type 8 can get from the pirated good. By 
definition, C(0, s )  = sU(a(O), 0 ) .  
~ ( 4 ,  T ( X )  
I Cumulative inverse hazard rate function. H ( 0 )  = j h(z )dr .  
0 
Generic representation of a pricing schedule as a continuum of quantity-price 
pairs, indexed by x E [O,p].  Under this pricing schedule, a customer who 
buys a quantity q(x)  is charged a total pricc r ( x ) .  
h(0) Inverse hazard rate function. h(0) = kEW f(0) . 
q'(0, v ,  s), r*(O, v, s )  Optimal pricing schedule for the legal good,. This is the profit-maximizing 
incentive compatible pricing schedule which induces participation from all 
customer types allocated a non-zero usage level. 
q Z P ( 0 , v ) , r Z P ( 8 , v )  
~ L a l i t ~  level of the pimted good as a function of the level of digital rights 
management technology p. 
Zero-piracy pricing schedule, which is the optimal pricing schedule in the 
absence of piracy 
g" (8,  u, s ) ,  rp' (0, v ,  s )  Piracy-indifferent pricing schedule. Under this incentiv+compatible pricing 
schedule, every customer of type B gets equal value from the legal product 
and the pirated product. 
V ( P )  Quality level of the legal good as a function of the level of digital rights 
management technology p. 
" 
Q ( P )  
Table 2.1: Summary of key notation 
At a level of protection p, the customer type in [0,8) which defines the 
transition from the piracy-indifferent portion of the contract. Types 0 5 6(p)  
have usage levels defined by qPr(O, v ( p ) ,  s ( p ) ) ,  while types B 2 6(p)  have 
usage levels defined by qZP(O,v(p)) 
s(P, t )  Quality level of the pirated good at  time t ,  as a function of the level of digital 
rights management technology p. 
The quality of the goods The seller announces a Customer types in set Q Customers and seller 
vand s become known pricing scheme q(e), ~ ( 8 )  purchase the legal good, their sur~luslprofns 
to customers and seller others use the pirated good 
o = {e. ~u(~(e ) ,e )  - ~ ( e )  2 ;(e.~)) 
Figure 3.1: Timeline of events for Section 3 
for b' E [b'zp, 81, and 
for 6 E [0, Bzp].  
Unless otherwise specified, all proofs are available in Appendix A. 
3. Pricing w i t h  digital piracy 
This section analyzes pricing strategy when the seller faces digital piracy. The sequence of events 
modeled in this section is summarized in Figure 3.1. 
3.1. Piracy-indifferent pricing schedule 
This section specifies the incentive-compatible pricing schedule that implements piracy-indifference. 
Under this pricing schedule, all customer types are exactly indierent between the legal good and 
the pirated good. This pricing schedule is important because it often forms a building block for 
the optimal pricing schedule. 
Proposition 1. The unique incentive-compatible piracy-indifferent pricing schedule qP1(b', u, s ) ,  ~ ~ ~ ( 6 ,  v,  s )  
for the legal good takes the following form: 
Under this pricing schedule, each customer type get the same surplnis from their optimal usage of 
the legal good of quality v and their maximal usage of the pirated good of quality s .  
Proposition 1 establishes that there is a unique piracy-indifferent pricing schedule, under which 
each customer type gets a net surplus exactly equal to their reservation utility - the value C(0, s) 
that they would get from their maximal usage of the pirated good. From equation (3.1), all customer 
types purchase positive quantities of the legal good under this pricing schedule. Moreover, their 
usage levels of the legal good are strictly increasing in the level of piracy s. In addition, (3.2) 
indicates that so long as s < v ,  the total payment T ~ ' ( O , V ,  s) from each customer type 0 is strictly 
positive. This establishes that the piracy-indifferent pricing schedule is strictly profitable for the 
seller. 
3.2. Optimal pricing schedule for lower levels of digital piracy 
The structure of the seller's optimal pricing schedule depends on the level of digital piracy s. This 
section describes how to design the optimal pricing schedule when the level of piracy is relatively 
low. Subsequently, Section 3.3 describes the solution to the corresponding problem at higher levels 
of digital piracy. 
Proposition 2. At lower levels of digital piracy - that is, when s 5 V(w - h(0)) - the sellers 
w 
optimal pricing schedule is a modified version of the zero-piracy pricing schedule, with total prices 
adjusted downwards by the same amount across dl usage levels. The optimal contract is: 
for all 0 E [O,8], where qZP(O,v) and r Z P ( 0 ,  v) are as defined in equations (2.7) and (2.8). 
Proposition 2 establishes that at lower levels of piracy'3, the optimal pricing schedule is simply 
the zerc-piracy pricing schedule, with a constant reduction in total price across all usage levels. The 
resulting usage levels of all consumers are unaffected by the presence of piracy, and the reduction 
in total price across all customers is proportionate to the level of piracy s. An immediate corollary 
is that as the level of piracy s increases, prices are strictly lower at all usage levels. 
The functions qZP(O, v )  and r Z P ( 0 ,  v ) ,  derived in part (a) of Lemma 1, form the optimal pric- 
ing schedule when the seller is unconstrained by piracy. As the level of piracy s increases, the 
'3Clearly, the condition s 5 v(W - h(0)) of Proposition 2 does not jwt depend on the level of piracy s, but also 
W 
depends on v, w, and h(0). The statement 'lower levels of piracy' is meant to indicate that for a fixed distribution, 
and fixed valurr of u and w, the propasition is more likely to apply at lower levels of s. 
reduction in total price lowers the seller's profits. In addition, under the optimal pricing schedule, 
all customer types get a surplus level which is higher than their reservation utility 0(0, s) (which 
was also the surplus to each customer under the piracy indifferent pricing schedule). This surplus 
increase is due to the seller's desire to increase profits beyond the level obtained under the piracy- 
indifferent contract, by inducing higher usage across all customer types. Higher usage is necessarily 
accompanied by an increase in surplus for all types, in order to ensure inceutive+compatibility. 
3.3. Optimal pricing schedule for higher levels of digital piracy 
In contrast with the previous result, this section describes the structure of the optimal pricing 
schedule at higher levels of digital piracy. 
Proposition 3. At higher level of piracy s - that is, when s > "J(W - h(0)) - the seller's optimal 
w 
pricing strategy is as follows: 
(a) Customer types are partitioned into two sets [O,8] and [8,8], where the transition type 8 is 
defined by: 
e = 0 : ~ h ( 0 )  = (V - S)(W + 0), 0 E (0,8). (3.5) 
(b) The optimal pricing schedule for the lower set of customers is simply the piracy-indifferent 
pricing schedule: 
for 0 E [0, 81. 
(c) The optimal pricing schedule for the higher set of customers is an adjusted version of the 
zero-piracy pricing schedule, with total prices adjusted downwards by the same amount across all 
usage levels: 
for 6' E [8,8], where ~ ~ ~ ( 0 ,  v) is as defined in part (a) of Lemma 1, in equation (2.8). 
Note that the pricing schedule q'(8, v, s), T*(@, v, s), while specified independently for each cus- 
tomer set, is incentive-compatible across the entire set of customer types [o,??]. 
Proposition 3 establishes that at higher levels of piracy, the portion of the optimal pricing 
schedule which is relevant to a lower set of customer types [0,6] is simply the piracy-indifferent 
pricing schedule. Since qP1(0,u,s)  > 0,  all these customer types purchase positive levels of the 
legal good. It can be shown that 6 > Bzp,  and therefore any customer type who did not purchase 
in the absence of piracy is nav a legal user, a t  their piracy-indifferent usage level qP'(0, u, s). 
Therefore, the presence of piracy can have the socially beneficial effect of inducing legal usage 
from customers who may have otherwise been excluded by the seller's optimal price discrimination. 
While counter-intuitive, this result has a straightforward economic explanation. In the absence of 
piracy, there is no imperfect substitute for the seller's legal good, since the seller is a monopolist, 
and the reservation utility of all customers is zero. Under this scenario, when optimally price- 
discriminating, the seller finds it more favorable to capture a higher level of surplus from the 
customer types 0 > Ozp,  at  the cost of excluding customer types [O,OzP] from the market. The 
only reason why customer types 0 E [0, BzP]  are excluded is because the seller's optimal surplus 
extraction from higher customer types would not be feasible if there was any positive usage level 
affordable for customer types 0 E [O,Bzp]. In the presence of piracy, each customer type who 
purchases the legal good must be provided with positive surplus of at  least C(B, s) - their value 
from maximal usage of the pirated good. Since the seller is forced to provide this surplus level to 
the higher set, customer types in the lower set can now be offered positive and affordable usage 
levels, without affecting incentive-compatibility (and the seller's price-discrimination objectives). 
In addition, since it is straightforward to establish that qZP(0,  s) < qP1(B, s )  for 0 E [O,6], total 
usage either remains constant or goes up for all customer types, relative to the usage levels under 
the zero-piracy contract, and this increase is more pronounced at  higher levels of piracy s. As 
a consequence, the total value vU(q*(O, v, s), 0 )  created by the usage of each customer type also 
increases, which in turn implies that total surplus is higher at  higher levels of s.  These observations 
are illustrated further in Figure 3.2. 
3.4. Example 
In this section, the optimal pricing schedule is derived explicitly for a specific family of customer 
type distributions. This example further illustrates the effects of digital piracy on pricing, usage, 
and welfare, and highlights the effect of some properties of the customer type distribution. 
Figure 3.2: (This figure is clearer when viewed electronically, or in color, since the curves 
are color-coded). Illustrates the changes in pricing and surplus as the quality of the pirated good s 
changes For s = sL,  s H ,  the piracy-indifferent pricing schedules are qP'(6',u, s ) , ~ ~ ' ( 0 ,  u, s ) ,  and the 
total surplus generated by the usage of customer type 8 is vU(qP'(B, u ,  s ) ,  6'). The difference between 
U U ( ~ ~ ' ( ~ ' , V , S ) ,  0 )  and T ~ ' ( ~ , V , S )  is the minimum surplus that type 6' must be provided in order 
to induce them to purchase the legal good, rather than using the pirated good. The thicker curves 
